Postwar & Peace

INTRODUCTION

The primary role of Armed forces in peace is to prepare for war. This means training personnel to be competent and efficient at the highest level possible, commensurate with the maintenance of welfare and morale. Weapons, equipment and platforms are maintained, tested and developed as far as technology and funding allows. The authenticity and realism of the threat and in operations is important for the development of both personnel and equipment. At the same time there is a need to meet peacetime requirements.

 In World Wars I and II sea mines were deployed by all major combatants. By the end of WWII over one million mines had been laid. Approximately one third could not be accounted for – over 300,000 mines had not sunk ships nor had they been located, swept, destroyed or washed up ashore. They were still under the sea.

 In addition to sea mines, targeted against ships or submarines, the oceans, particularly coastal areas, were littered with the explosive detritus of two world wars and previous conflicts. Much work was done to clear areas essential for commerce and other uses but many hazardous areas remained. Special charts were provided to guide shipping clear of danger and clearance operations continued for many years.

During the post WWII period, as a result of lessons learned during the war, strategies and tactics were reaffirmed or revised; new equipment and weapon systems were introduced. In the case of mine countermeasures a class of ships was built, the Ton Class. These were made mostly of wood and aluminium, fitted with degaussing and resiliently mounted machinery. Their equipment included traditional mechanical sweeps, for cutting mines’ mooring wires plus acoustic and magnetic sweeps against influence mines. Many were later converted to mine hunters, retaining mechanical sweeps but also being fitted with sonar, for searching out buoyant and ground mines of all types.

The Ton class of Mine sweepers and Mine Hunters proved to be very capable in their primary Mine Countermeasures role and were also employed as patrol vessels throughout the remainder of the 20th century. Their contribution to mine warfare throughout the postwar and Cold War periods can not be overstated. Although crude and basic by today’s standards the training provided and the systems fitted were effective and heavily utilised.

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They were eventually replaced by the HUNT Class, combining a mine sweeping and hunting capability and later, the SANDOWN Class mine hunter.

(Find out more about these modern Mine Countermeasures Vessels and present operations here).

Sea mines and other World War I and II explosive ordnance are still being found. The ongoing requirement to clear these hazards was increased in scale by the many conflicts since 1945. Worldwide, there have been 24 incidences of aggressive sea mining since then. Other types of old ordnance are also present.

Detection and disposal of these dangerous items is therefore a peacetime task for mine countermeasures vessels and clearance divers that equates directly to their war role. Not only is this essential work necessary for the safety of the seas but, dangerous though it is, it fulfils all the requirements of training for war.

The twenty-four naval mining events since 1945 provide a series of contrasts, with the employment of mines varying between small-scale and localised disruptive events, through to large scale blockade.

This website will concentrate on those operations in which the Royal Navy was involved.

POST WAR OPERATIONS

From “Naval Minewarfare: Politics to Practicalities” by Captain Chris O’Flaherty, Royal Navy. Abridged and very slightly amended by Geoff Goodwin. (The writing of this publication was partially funded by the Guy Hudson Memorial Trust)

THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (OPERATION RETAIL) - 1946

Albania proclaimed independence from the (Turkish) Ottoman Empire on 28 November 1912. Thereafter occupied by the Austro-Hungarian army for much of World War I, Italy became a significant force in the Allied fight to expel Central Powers forces, taking Allied (Entente Powers) responsibility for Albania’s subsequent occupation, which lasted until 2 September 1920. Five months prior to the outbreak of World War II, Italy again invaded

Albania and declared it an Italian protectorate, until Mussolini was overthrown in 1943 and the German army installed a government sympathetic to the Axis cause. The Albanian National Liberation Army coordinated subsequent resistance to the occupation of their country, assisting the expulsion of German forces across the border into Kosovo and, by October 1944, re-establishing Albanian self-rule. This fledgling state thereafter stepped back from major engagement at the end of World War II as it sought both internal stability and also its perceived rightful place of the world stage.

The coast of Albania had been mined extensively by German forces during World War II, but Albania had no viable navy with which to address this menace. Between 11 and 13 October 1944 a British Yard Minesweeper of the 153rd Minesweeping Flotilla created a swept route through the Corfu Channel. Further ‘check’ minesweeping by the 8th Minesweeping Flotilla in January 1945 included HMS Regulus on 12 January 1945 striking a mine and sinking 46 minutes later. Following the defeat of the Germans in Europe, the International Central Mine Clearance Board, via its Mediterranean Zone Board, then oversaw mine-clearance activities off the coasts of Albania and Greece including distribution of details of all swept channels. Whilst Greece was represented on the Zone Board, Albania’s lack of possession of any minesweeping forces meant it was not invited to join the Board, even as an observer. Ordering and conducting missions under its international remit, albeit without coastal state concurrence, the International Routing and Reporting Authority in late 1945 duly notified international shipping that Medri Routes 18/32 and 18/34 through the North Corfu Channel, and within Albanian Territorial Waters, were cleared of mines.

By May 1946, this safe route through the Corfu Channel was in regular use. At 08:30 on 15 May 1946 two British warships, HM Ships Orion and Superb, were transiting the swept channel when they were fired upon by the Albanian shore batteries located in the vicinity of Port Edda. Despite not having formal diplomatic relations, the British government delivered via its Chargé d’Affaire a written protest to the Albania Minister in Belgrade; the Albanians confirmed that an incident had taken place but contested that due to Greek boats regularly entering Albanian waters and ports to abduct Albanian citizens and take them to Corfu, they had issued prior warning to the approaching ships before firing. The Albanians further contested that the two British warships had been mis-identified due to them not displaying their flags and, with undertones of a concerted Albanian attempt to assert their sovereignty, they classed the incident as a ‘regrettable misunderstanding’.

The United Kingdom responded by pointing out that the Albanians had ‘no right at all to interfere with shipping passing through the Corfu Channel’. Following further unsatisfactory (to the British) written exchanges, on 21 September 1946 the British Admiralty sent to their Commander-in-Chief of their Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Willis, a signal that consideration was being given by His Majesty’s Government to establishing diplomatic relations with Albania, and enquiring ‘whether the Albanians have learned to behave themselves’, going on to enquire if any Royal Navy ships under Willis’ command had transited the North Strait (Corfu Channel) since August. None had, so Willis ordered HM Ships Mauritius, Leander, Saumarez and Volage to transit the strait when they departed Corfu on 22 October 1946. This was to be an overt British assertion of the right of innocent passage through the strait, and furthered the British policy of ensuring freedom of navigation for ships, which was vital to both British maritime trade as well as naval influence.

According to a sworn affidavit subsequently submitted to the International Court of Justice, overnight on either 17 or 18 October 1946 two ‘Marjan’ class Yugoslav minelayers, the Mljet and Meljine, departed from the port of Sibenik (350 miles north of the Corfu Channel) loaded with between forty and forty-five German Y-type moored contact mines left behind by German occupying forces. The witness, Lieutenant Commander Kovacic, went on to affirm that when he next saw the two ships in Sibenik at the end of October, they still had their mining rails fitted, but had no mines onboard.

This potential minelay was unbeknown to the British, who, on departing from their port visit to Corfu, opposite Albania, entered the newly mined channel. With all ships at a modified form of action stations, just in case the Albanians engaged with shore batteries, at 14:53 local time the second in line, HMS Saumarez, was rocked by a huge explosion that ripped open her starboard side, just forward of the bridge. Rear-Admiral Kinahan leading in his Flagship, HMS Mauritius, had passed through the mineline and ordered HMS Volage, last in line, to aid the stricken destroyer.

With Saumarez spewing smoke, and a substantial part of her ship’s side missing, allowing her bow to hang limp like a partially severed limb, Volage closed to take her in tow. Just as she made her second approach a small boat came out from shore claiming to be carrying the local Albanian Harbour Master, who enquired as to who the ships were, but offered no assistance. The warships passed lines, then towing Saumarez stern-first to reduce water pressure on her exposed internal bulkheads, Volage found another mine further back along the channel and at 16:15 the first 40 feet of her bows were blown clear away whilst the remainder of the ship whipped from the new explosion. Exceptional damage control efforts in both ships, augmented by stores and personal sent from Mauritius and Leander, kept both victims afloat until morning, with Leander having bravely re-entered the minefield to tow both of her disabled compatriots away from the unseen menace and south towards the safety of Corfu harbour. Once able to draw breath, the casualties were added up: Two destroyers had been mutilated, their bows each amputated by a single mine. In HMS Saumarez eleven sailors died, and a further twenty-five were missing, presumed dead. In HMS Volage two died, and a further six sailors were missing, presumed dead. Despite the World War ending over a year before, British sailors had just been killed by freshly laid mines.

The fallout was immediate. The United Kingdom filed protests, despatched coercive battlegroups and harangued Albania across the globe. Seeing the apparent Albanian action as a threat to their mastery of the seas, they also ordered the re-sweeping of the Channel. On 13 November 1946, under the banner of Operation RETAIL, HM Ships Seabear and Welfare re-opened the passage by clearing twenty-two ex-German GY-moored contact mines off the Albanian coast, whilst under both the watchful gaze of the Albanians ashore and that of an embarked observer from France (which was by then a fellow permanent member of the United Nations Security Council).

On 27 February 1947, the newly constituted UN established an enquiry, seeing this as a major test of its remit to ensure world peace. With both facts and obfuscation starting to emerge, the situation was on 9 April 1947 referred to the International Court of Justice, where it became the court’s first ever case.

The Corfu Channel Case, as it became known, provides a useful example of plausible deniability through a state, in this case Albania, successfully employing both the delay in the obtaining of evidence indicating attribution, and also ambiguities in that evidence, to sow substantial seeds of doubt in respect of who actually laid the mines in the Corfu Channel in October 1946. In their submission to the ICJ they blame variously: old mines from German minefields (the World War II minefield referred to by the Allies as QBY 257); Italy (the initial occupying power in Albania, who was driven out in 1943); Yugoslavia (the nearest state known to stock the mines in question, and from where it is possible the minelaying vessels started their journey); Greece (the adjacent power on the opposite side of the 3-mile wide channel); and the UK, who Albania argued could have mined their own ships simply to cause an incident.

The legal implications of this case still resonate into the 21st, but suffice to say here that: the Albanians were not found to have actually laid the mines, but were at least complicit in their laying; the Albanians had no right to lay, or allow the laying of, the mines as this obstructed the international right of Innocent Passage; through being at least complicit in the laying of the mines, the Albanians owed compensation to the British government (totalling £843,947.00); and that the British infringed Albanian sovereignty by minesweeping in Albanian Territorial Waters without permission.

SUEZ (OPERATIONS MUSKETEER (UK) REVISE (FRANCE) KADESH (ISRAEL) - 1956

For a few brief years between 1953 and 1956 the world saw no new naval mining until, on 26 July 1956, President Nasser of Egypt ordered the occupation and nationalisation of the Suez Canal.  Until that date it had been owned by British and French (among others) shareholders of the Paris Stock Exchange’s Suez Canal Company. In violation of the 1888 Constantinople Convention guaranteeing free navigation of the canal without distinction as to Flag state, on the same day Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping.

Britain and France decided that military intervention was necessary to retake ownership, and thus control. Israel was wholly supportive, but the United States was against such a move. Following unsuccessful diplomatic moves by the United States, a plan was devised for Israel to invade Sinai followed by an Anglo-French assault on Egypt’s canal zone.

On 31 October 1956 a British and French bombing campaign commenced; Egypt’s president Nasser responded by sinking all forty ships present in the canal, closing it to shipping until early the following year. By 5 November an airborne assault by British and French forces had commenced, followed on 6 November by a Royal Marine assault at Port Said.

Suspecting that Egyptian mining had occurred, British and French mine countermeasures forces were integrated in this operation, conducting formation-mechanical and also follow-on influence sweeping, marked by danbuoys.

In the absence of US support, including in the UN where a ceasefire was brokered for 23:59 on 6 November 1956, British and French forces were forced to withdraw, with the last troops departing on 23 December 1956.

A 2 November 1956 UN General Assembly resolution (997 (ES-I)) had called for steps to be taken to reopen the canal. This work was then commenced by a UN-led force, which included UN-crewed salvage shipping, managed by Dutch and Danish salvage firms, plus Egyptian watercraft, all overseen by American Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler.

By 14 November 1956 the Egyptians had confirmed the presence of mines in the approaches to the Suez Canal, with further information forthcoming that mines had been laid in the canal south of El Cap. Having already through diplomatic means denied the British and French their ‘prize’ of the canal, this declaration of mining meant that even with the continued presence of foreign forces under an armistice, they were concurrently denied their prize through military means. With a major international waterway now legally declared as unsafe to use through ceasefire-agnostic mining, the Egyptians also ensured that the conflict would remain an international focus.

On Saturday 17 November, the British Minesweepers Sefton, Dufton and Hickleton, plus two wire-sweep French Minesweepers, commenced a check-sweep of the canal; whilst proceeding south at the 32 Kilometre mark HMS Sefton was overtaken by a jeep carrying a Norwegian Colonel who told them to stop – a new diplomatic agreement had prohibited further sweeping, so the ships recovered their gear, turned and restreamed their sweeps (for their own safety) before returning to port. This was the only example of what was in fact very limited foreign mine-clearance activity.

The Egyptians had evidently kept good records of their minefields as by 28 December 1956 they had reportedly navigated Lieutenant General Wheeler’s UN salvage vessels through these fields en route to other salvage operations. Precise details of the Egyptian mine-clearance operations are unclear, although subsequent mine-clearance operations in 1974 (see later) do include reports of mines and explosive ordnance being found that may be dated to the 1956 conflict; thus, with precise details unclear, ground mines may have been left to sterilise themselves, with any moored mines swept by the Egyptian Navy and sunk utilising ‘disposal by gunfire’. Alternately, the Egyptian declaration of mining may have been a ruse.

The canal was reopened to traffic in 24 April 1957, after Egypt reported as cleared both the naval minefields and (with UN assistance) all sunken ships. UN General Assembly resolution 1212, adopted on 14 December 1957, acknowledged the reopening of the canal. With a little help based on the persistent threat of mines, the Egyptian strategic plan for canal ownership had succeeded.

More RN mine warfare and diving stories.

Find out about modern Minesweepers, Mine Hunters, Diving Teams and ongoing operations here.

Check out the Ton Class Association.

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