Suez Clearances
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR - 1973
From “Naval Minewarfare: Politics to Practicalities” by Captain Chris O’Flaherty, Royal Navy (The writing of this publication was partially funded by the Guy Hudson Memorial Trust)
By 1973 the occupation by Israel of the Sinai desert had denied Egypt six years of income from the Suez Canal (which was still closed by blockships) as well as proving to be a major embarrassment to Egypt and other Arab countries. United States-led overtures at settlement, including a proposed partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in exchange for reopening the canal, had in early February 1973 seen Egypt’s envoy, Ahmad Ismail, spend three days in Russia, during which the Soviet Union gave its ‘full understanding’ to the Egyptian position of opposing a partial settlement with Israel.
The continued closure of the Suez Canal during this period of tension saw in early 1973 Egypt’s redeployment of submarines from their Mediterranean coast to the Red Sea port of Safaga, achieved by routing the vessels via the Cape of Good Hope. This was ordered by Rear Admiral Fuad Zukri (Commander of the Navy) as part of preparations for Operations SPARK and BADR, which required reinforcing the Red Sea Squadron. Operational plans included arrangements with Pakistan for ship repair facilities and with Yemen for use of the port of Aden. Having deployed over fifty ships to stations in both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, at 13:00 hours on 6 October 1973 Admiral Zukri issued orders to his Red Sea ships and submarines to commence hostilities at 18:00 and that the Straits of Tiran, Bab-al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Suez were to be closed to all shipping; this was not a formal blockade (the Admiral did not want to use such forceful language), but was explained as ‘taking action against sea communications’.
Rejecting partial settlement, a surprise attack was launched by Arab coalition forces with the intent of driving the Israelis out of the occupied areas. Egyptian forces crossed the still-closed Suez Canal en masse and advanced almost unopposed across the Sinai. Protecting their flanks, they laid naval minefields at the entrance to the Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba, with the reported intent not only of preventing Israeli maritime movement behind Egyptian troops but also to protect the Bala’eem oil field from Israeli ‘pirating’, which would have further affected adversely the Egyptian economy.
The war itself was short, lasting only nineteen days. In that time the majority of action occurred in pursuit of primary objectives ashore, which for Egypt were the liberation of Sinai, and for Israel were vain attempts to hold their 1967 gains. Towards the end of the war Israel’s shortage of fuel, which Edgar O’Ballance describes vividly, resulted in them employing increasing levels of determination and enduring heightened operational risk as they sought to replenish oil supplies. This pursuit of oil was probably a significant factor in the sinking by a mine of the Israeli-chartered, but Liberian registered, 28,748-ton tanker Siris; on 26 October 1973 she was sailing ‘in ballast’ (i.e. empty) through the Straits of Gubal allegedly en route to the oil terminal at Abu Rodeis (near the Balmein oil rig) when it struck a mine, quickly grounding herself near the Ashrafi lighthouse before slipping back and sinking in deeper water. She was salvaged in 1978.
The Egyptian naval mining campaign did contribute to flank protection and to blockade but received limited coverage in many publications on the war. This lack of exposure of naval mining probably reflects its subordinate status to the many land battles and resulting operational and tactical analysis which dominate other descriptions of the conflict. However, when added to the still uncleared mining and blockship activities from the 1967 war it did leave a significant legacy that required a coordinated effort to clean up.
POST WAR MINE COUNTERMEASURES AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
By 1973 the Egyptian Navy had fourteen minesweepers, but they were insufficiently experienced or equipped to undertake the major mine and ordnance-clearance task they faced. In addition to the Egyptian national effort, two separate coalitions deployed to reopen the Suez Canal – in a masterstroke of Egyptian diplomacy one was the US-led Western coalition of the US, UK and France, whilst the other was a Soviet squadron specially deployed from their now-complete operations in Bangladesh.
At the northern entrance to the canal, Egyptian defensive minefields were known to exist on either side of Port Said. An approach lane to the port was quickly cleared by Egyptian minesweepers employing both mechanical (wire) sweeps and magnetic/acoustic sweeps, giving at least some degree of initial access.
Turning to the Western efforts, on 3 January 1974 the British Naval Attaché in Cairo first suggested the Royal Navy should get involved in the projected clearance of the Suez Canal. Following a technical assessment by the Ministry of Defence in London, this was communicated to the Royal Navy’s Captain Mine Countermeasures on 10 January. After the British Ambassador’s formal offer on 12 February was accepted by the Egyptian government, preparations began for a force of HM Ships Abdiel, Bossington, Maxton and Wilton to sail to the area, with a reconnaissance party despatched to the Suez Canal arriving on 11 March. The British mission was codenamed Operation RHEOSTAT One.
After initially focussing on clearing Port Said harbour and approaches, providing themselves with a safe operating base and areas from which to stage into the canal, operations in the canal itself commenced on 1 May 1974. Working in temperatures of up to 106° Fahrenheit (41° centigrade) the British worked five-days-on then two-days-off, hand in glove with US helicopters who provided precursor MCM to enhance safety. Having by 29 May 1974 staged forward from Port Said to Ismalia, their warmest operational welcome was on 26 June 1974 when they entered the Great Bitter Lake, finally freeing the fourteen merchant ships who had been trapped in that isolated pond since the canal had closed in 1967. On 14 July 1974, HMS Maxton laid claim to being the first ship to conduct a complete Suez Canal transit in over six years.
Concurrently with UK’s RHEOSTAT One, the US Navy had been approached. Three US operations were stood up: Operation NIMBUS STAR (Air Mine Countermeasures, or AMCM); Operation NIMBUS MOON WATER (Sidescan Survey and Diving Training in an advisory capacity); and Operation NIMBUS MOON LAND (US Army EOD Training and advisory operations). The US choice of Air Mine Countermeasures as their preferred method of search was driven by reports that an Israeli aircraft had dropped a Mk 36 Destructor mine, with a very sensitive magnetic fuze, into the canal. CH53 helicopters were flown forward from the USA to the Royal Air Force base at Akrotiri in Cyprus, where they were assembled before embarking in USS Iwo Jima. Between 12 April and 2 June they conducted extensive AMCM sweeping along the Suez Canal including the Bitter and Timsah lakes plus Suez Bay as far south as latitude 29°49’N. There were reports of up to eight mines being exploded by the AMCM sweeping, but correlation with Egyptian Army operations later proved that the explosions were in fact army disposal teams who had rather carelessly, and with dubious safety, coincided their explosive destruction of old ordnance at the precise moment of passing by the US helicopters!
The French forces consisted of FS Acanthe and Gardenia, with rotation of units seeing FS Giroflee, Ajonc and Lilas also deployed. Their ships focussed their efforts on the support of diving operations in the 0–3 metre depth band either side of the canal. Towards the end of their planned operation a line of ‘run down’ (i.e. with expired batteries) AMD500 influence ground mines was made known to the Western mine-clearance forces, but an already agreed timetable for retrograde of both UK and US forces meant this was left for a subsequent clearance mission, understood to have been completed by the French in 1984.
With ships and aircraft having swept the deeper waters of the canal, a combined Royal Navy Fleet Clearance Diving Team and twelve-man Egyptian diving element searched the bank to a depth of 8 metres. Their task was to augment the French diving efforts and to achieve comprehensive clearance of the explosive remnants of war. Along the banks considerable ordnance was found and disposed of during a focussed period between 15:00 and 15:30 daily. In the deeper anchorages only limited ordnance was found, plus a sunken corvette and a Blenheim aircraft. In total, UK disposal forces alone dealt with twenty-eight bombs ranging from 250 to 1,000lbs.
The Soviet MCM force had by this time proceeded from their forward base in Bangladesh to the region. Tasked (or asked) by the Egyptians to clear the southern approaches to the Suez Canal, they had initially resisted Egyptian overtures to assist in reopening the canal itself. But after their diplomatic successes in Chittagong, coupled with the regional visibility being given to the Western-led clearance activities, they decided to exert the assistive diplomatic muscle of deployed minewarfare forces to gain leverage with the Egyptians, ensuring that any future arrangements for the administration of the canal would continue to allow an unimpeded flow of Soviet warships. On 31 May 1974 the Helicopter Carrier Leningrad departed Sevastapol with both Admiral Gorshkov and Marshal Grechko on the jetty, signifying the strategic importance of this mission; she proceeded to Port Said where she worked with Egyptian forces in expanding access to this port. To the south, whilst clearing the inner channel of the Straits of Gubal, the Soviet forces liaised closely, and successfully, with Israel (who claimed some of the waters as their own) thereby demonstrating that the Soviet navy could develop through naval diplomacy the manoeuvring room required to successfully execute complex operations. At its peak the Soviets committed to the operation seven minesweepers plus the Leningrad. Militarily, this clearance mission by Soviet MCM forces also had significance in demonstrating to their foes their technical competence in mine countermeasures, not least because many of the mines laid were of Soviet origin.
Minewarfare is a game of probabilities, and despite the very best efforts of all participants, unequivocal assurances of the canal being mine-free could not be given to the Egyptian authorities. In any case, over six years of disuse had seen the canal silt up such that guaranteed minimum depths could not be assured, and many obstructions still needed to be cleared. This clearing and dredging work was overseen by the Egyptian authorities, who, towards the end of their efforts, wished to achieve as high a level of safety as practicable prior to reopening. By invitation of the Egyptians, a follow-on Operation, known as Operation RHEOSTAT Two thus occurred in early 1975, led by HMS Abdiel, with HM Ships Hubberston and Sheraton working together to complete the check-hunting/sweeping mission. Between 19 April 1975 and 4 June 1975 the British ships re-searched the canal, but this time finding only some old vehicles, oil and petrol drums, assorted metal objects such as beer cans, and an almost intact porcelain lavatory pan!
Following this huge, sustained, multinational, mine and ordnance-clearance effort, the Suez Canal was reopened to traffic on 5 June 1975, only two hours after the last check-sweep was completed. But despite even this monumental effort, in July 1975 ‘a merchant ship was damaged by an apparent mine explosion in the main channel soon after the canal reopened’. Such is the circle of minewarfare, but the canal stayed open.
For an alternative account of Operation RHEOSTAT I click on UK Task Force 65.2
Find out about modern Minesweepers, Mine Hunters, Diving Teams and ongoing operations here.
