The Falklands Conflict 1982

Content:

Mine Warfare, Diving and EOD Operations during Operation Corporate - A Personal Account

Setting Up the MCM Cell

HMS ANTELOPE and the Royal Engineers

Mine Warfare, Diving and EOD Operations during the Falkland Islands Conflict 1982 - Another Perspective

Mine Warfare and Diver Honours and Awards for Operations in the South Atlantic 

Mine WarfarE, Diving AND EOD Operations DURING OPERATION CORPORATE - A PERSONAL ACCOUNT

 By Lieutenant Commander Martyn Holloway Royal Navy, Commanding Officer, HMS CORDELLA and Senior Officer, 11th MCM (Trawler) Squadron, 1982.

Sea mines were planted off Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands following the Argentine invasion of 2 April 1982, however, one of our nuclear powered submarines nearby heard them doing it.  Where else had they laid them everyone wondered, what if the chosen landing approaches had been mined?  These thoughts prompted an urgent need for mine countermeasures in the South Atlantic. 

Unfortunately the elderly ‘Ton’ Class coastal minesweepers and hunters in service at the time were unsuited for the South Atlantic weather, nor were any of the new replacements yet available.  Accordingly, five Hull trawlers were requisitioned, some of which were fishing on the high seas when they had word.  Each one was told to proceed to Rosyth and if needed were met by freezer trucks waiting on the jetty.  They were emptied of catch and fishing gear before being fitted out as Minesweepers Auxiliary (MSA) and all within a couple of days. 

The five Hull trawlers were crewed entirely by the Royal Navy, mainly from the 1st and 4th Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Squadrons and were commanded by the most junior commanding officers in the Task Force.  Following conversion and a two day work up, the hurriedly formed 11th MCM Squadron comprising HM Ships Cordella, Northella, Junella and Farnella sailed from Portland on 27 April 1982 heading south.  HMS Pict would catch up a few days later in the Bay of Biscay.

The ships’ companies immediately got to grips with their unfamiliar ships, fixing and maintaining equipment where it was needed and it was definitely needed, particularly when it came to damage control.  The heavy steel doors and hatches had to shut properly in the event of a hull breach, for there were few enough doors and hatches and they were all vital.  They fought unreliable machinery, dealt with fires, floods and breakdowns and felt just a little naked without proper self-defensive armament or adequate communications.

Heading south the ships practised mine sweeping evolutions on a daily basis whenever the weather allowed arriving at Ascension Island for fuel on 11 May 1982. Here they met up with Fleet Clearance Diving Team (FCDT) 3 that had flown in courtesy of the RAF hoping to embark for the remainder of the journey to the Falkland Islands. 

Three Fleet Clearance Diving Teams had deployed to the South Atlantic of which two were allocated to the Amphibious Task Group.  Team 1 under Lieutenant Commander Brian Dutton, a mine warfare and clearance diving specialist (MCD), were already embarked in HMS Intrepid.  Team 2 under Fleet Chief Petty Officer (Diver) John Dadd meanwhile had embarked with a Fleet Maintenance Unit in the requisitioned oil rig support ship DV Stena Seaspread, ready to assist with any underwater battle damage repair work that might be required.  The ship was kept well clear of hostilities in the nominated Tug, Repair and Logistics Area (TRALA) some 200 miles east of the Falkland Islands and out of range of the Argentine Air Force.

But plans change and FCDT 3 was ordered to take passage in Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Sir Bedivere and head directly to the Falkland Islands at best speed.  Once fuelled, the minesweeping trawlers headed south receiving vital minesweeping equipment necessary to stream an Oropesa sweep that was air dropped to them en route.

(Doing the initial planning back in Rosyth and working with Lieutenant Commander (MCD) Chris Pott, I quickly realised that we would need a precursor minesweeping capability to protect the ships against shallow moored mines. The reported mine fields were in relatively shallow water and the mine cases were obviously shallow moored, thus making the trawlers vulnerable.  I contacted the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment (AUWE) at Portland to see if we could revive a proper Algerine Oropesa sweep, using just the using larger sized gear that had not been used since WW2.  The boffins in the minesweeping department at AUWE still had all the ww2 tables and float wire lengths so we embarked the Algerine Oropesa (Jumbo) floats, nowadays used used to support acoustic sweeps on the ‘Tons’. The only parts missing then were the four legged otter/diverter slings.  

These heavy duty slings had to be made in the Blacksmith's shop at Rosyth Dockyard and were then flown out and dropped by parachute to us some six hundred miles south of Ascension Island, along with five copies of the previous day’s Sun newspaper - a welcome gesture from the lads in Rosyth.  It was fortunate too that 6 months beforehand, while in post as the 1st MCM Squadron’s Operations Officer,  I had the opportunity to exercise the Squadron in the forgotten art of formation Double Oropesa (OO) minesweeping, so I was hot to trot. )

The 11 MCM Squadron was diverted to South Georgia while still some 5 days passage time east north east of the Falkland Islands.  Soon the daily minesweeping drills had to cease as the five Hull trawlers entered the ‘Roaring 40s’ latitudes where rough seas, fog and icebergs were encountered. 

South Georgia lies further south and thus nearer to Antarctica than the Falkland Islands. The MSAs were immediately set to work transferring the 3,200 men of 5 Infantry Brigade with their arms and ammunition from the Cunard liner RMS Queen Elizabeth II (QE2) that arrived later that evening to ships that would convey them to the Falklands.  It was an astonishing evolution completed safely within a remarkable 36 hours and allowed the QE2 to escape before the Argentines realised she had been there. 

For the next 8 days the trawlers worked hard at their new found logistic role in transferring large quantities of food, stores and ammunition between merchant ships and RFAs, essential for the final assault on Stanley.  The worst of the Antarctic winter now began to bite.  Weather conditions varied from benign to atrocious and could change quickly from sun to driving rain then blizzard snow to fog with little notice.  Wind speeds sometimes exceeded 100 knots and on two occasions merchant ships dragged their anchors and were in danger of foundering on a lee shore. They hurriedly got underway at very short notice to escape into the open sea, bringing their little friends tied up alongside them.

The amphibious landings at San Carlos on the morning of 21 May were thankfully uneventful from a mine warfare perspective although ships unloading troops, stores and ammunition and their escorts were now subjected to a severe and sustained bombing campaign by the Argentine Air Force over the next several days.  Many of the bombs although well aimed thankfully did not explode, yet nobody had foreseen the problem of removing them from where they lay in the ships, a situation that was to severely affect the readiness of defending escorts and landing ships. 

Disposal of unexploded ordnance in the Royal Navy is the responsibility of the Clearance Diving branch.  Tasking for the two Fleet Clearance Diving Team’s allocated to the Amphibious Task Group had been anticipated primarily as diving based for which they were well prepared and although efforts had been made to draw the correct war stock Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tool kits, these were not supplied to the naval teams on a technical point as the Falkland Islands were ‘out of area’, bureaucracy here endangering servicemen’s lives!

HMS Antrim was the first to report an unexploded bomb (UXB) on the afternoon of 21 May 1982 and an EOD element of three from FCDT1 comprising Able Seaman (Diver) Nigel Pullen and Leading Seaman (Diver) Gary Sewell led by Fleet Chief Petty Officer (Diver) Mick Fellows BEM was flown out by helicopter onto Antrim between air raids  On reaching the UXB another air attack came in forcing them to brace the bomb with their legs to prevent it from rolling around until the ship had ceased its violent manoeuvring.  The tail fuze had been badly damaged on impact and it was impossible to determine whether the bomb had armed.  A hole was then cut in the flight deck and in a quiet moment between air raids the bomb was carefully lifted and lowered over the ship’s side using sheer legs.  Fleet Chief Petty Officer (Diver) Michael Fellows was later awarded a Distinguished Service Cross for his resolve and leadership in removing the UXB that day.

During these attacks HMS Ardent had been hit by 9 or 10 bombs not all of which had exploded.  She had subsequently been abandoned on fire and was in a sinking condition.  HMS Argonaut then reported two UXBs onboard, one in a forward missile magazine, the other aft in the boiler room.

Lieutenant Commander Christopher Meatyard (MCD) coordinating the teams tasking, was advised that a two man Royal Engineer EOD team was also available should he need them.  Of particular note was that they had the correct EOD tools to disarm these bombs with them that the Royal Navy teams did not have. 

FCDT, under Lieutenant Commander Brian Dutton QGM (MCD), met Argonaut on her arrival in San Carlos the following day and found one bomb lodged below a boiler such that it could not be removed safely.  The Royal Engineer EOD team were called in and removed the fuze remotely allowing the ship’s company to move the now safe bomb and despatch it overboard.

Lieutenant Commander Meatyard made plans to commence work on HMS Ardent but she was found to be in imminent danger of sinking and the plan was abandoned.

On Sunday 23 May 1982 HMS Antelope in San Carlos Water was hit by two bombs that had not exploded and requested EOD assistance .

Meanwhile, onboard HMS Argonaut, Lieutenant Commander Meatyard had begun to investigate the second UXB in the missile magazine while FCDT1 sent a diver down to measure the external bomb entry hole so that a patch could be made.

HMS Argonaut’s missile magazine had flooded and had seawater mixed with diesel fuel which was now up to the hatch coaming, pumps could barely keep pace with the ingress of water.  Lieutenant Commander Meatyard entered the flooded magazine in diving equipment with Argonaut’s Ship’s Diving Officer to first clear human remains in the magazine and then survey the UXB that they found buried under boxes of ammunition, resting between two damaged missiles.  Sub Lieutenant Peter Morgan of HMS Argonaut, who later undertook training and qualified as a MCD Officer, was subsequently cited for his part in the operation and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.  Part of his citation reads:

‘On two occasions he dived into the flooded forward magazine, in the knowledge that in addition to the hazards posed by twisted and jagged metal, there was an unexploded bomb in the compartment amongst damaged ordnance.’

The Royal Engineer EOD team arrived to deal with Argonaut’s second bomb but as flooding in the magazine was not yet under control they were despatched to Antelope as they had the tools to disarm the two bombs there.  Sometime later a loud explosion was heard around the anchorage and a major fire was seen onboard Antelope.  Unfortunately they had been unsuccessful and one of the two man Royal Engineer EOD team had been killed and the other seriously injured.  The gallant Staff Sergeant James Prescott RE was later posthumously awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal and Warrant Officer John Phillips RE, who was severely wounded in the explosion, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.  The fire spread and led to the second bomb cooking off and exploding, resulting in the total loss of the ship that sank some hours later. 

Now, Royal Navy EOD personnel would have to improvise methods of removing unexploded bombs from ships without first having rendered them safe beforehand, an activity contrary to doctrine with an extremely high risk of failure. 

FCDT1, under Lieutenant Commander Dutton, completed clearing damaged ordnance away from the Argonaut bomb in the forward Sea Cat missile magazine and estimated another 4 days would be required to complete the job of carefully lifting and moving the bomb through the ship to where it could be lowered over the side. 

On 24 May 1982 early in the afternoon and following successive air attacks RFA Landing Ships Logistic (LSL) Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot reported UXBs onboard.  FCDT3 under Lieutenant Nigel (Bernie) Bruen, Royal Navy [note that nobody is allowed to be called Nigel in the Clearance Diving branch] that had arrived in San Carlos to the shocking sight of the burning Antelope, now undertook the removal of the UXBs in the two RFAs, splitting the team between the two ships but progressing one bomb at a time.

To ensure all teams were undisturbed in this dangerous work their activities would now be limited to night operations only where they could avoid the disruption caused by the daily air raids and work through undisturbed.

On 25 May 1982 the work of FCDT 3 in the landing ships was disturbed by the need to role change when a report of suspicious underwater noises required investigation by the use of diver searches of the affected ships.  Were ships being attacked by enemy frogman?  FCDT1 also role changed from their work on the second Argonaut bomb to conduct hull searches but nothing untoward was found.

Both teams then went back to their respective UXBs and worked hard for the rest of that night with little further disturbance for a change.  The one half of FCDT3 under Lieutenant Bruen completed the removal of Sir Galahad’s UXB in the small hours of 26 May 1982, aided by a technical team from HMS Fearless that had cut an exit route through the ship and provided the rigging required to sling the bomb. 

See Bernie Bruen’s account of the Sir Galahad bomb incident here.

With the help of the ship’s crane driver who had volunteered to remain onboard, the bomb was lifted clear of the battery workshop where it had come to rest having smashed up several carboys of battery acid.  Waiting below in the water were two Gemini inflatable boats, one of which had been lined with the nearest available source of padding to cushion the bomb, boxes and boxes of cornflakes and Merchant Navy kapok life jackets.  Leading Seaman (Diver) Anthony ‘Tommo’ Thompson and Seaman (Diver) Clive ‘Buster ‘Mottram guided the bomb into the boat and then towed it away, aiming to sink the boat and bomb together well clear of other shipping in the anchorage.  Their efforts to sink the Gemini by puncturing the buoyancy tanks with their diving knives did not work and, fearing that they were being blown towards other ships at anchor in the rising wind, they took the brave decision to roll the bomb over the side.  This was an exemplary and unselfish action taken by these two young sailors who might well have perished in their attempt to keep the bomb away from other ships;.considerable risks were being taken with young peoples lives.  Leading Seaman (Diver) Thompson was later Mentioned in Despatches.

With the experience of SIR GALAHAD’s UXB behind them, FCDT3 began clearing the area around SIR LANCELOT’s UXB that they estimated would be removed from the ship within 2 days.

FCDT3 had previously been based onboard various ships and that had restricted their availability should their ship be required for tasks away from San Carlos.  FCDT1 was based in HMS Intrepid throughout and was from time to time unavailable for this reason.  FCDT3 decided to move ashore to Ajax Bay which suited them better for their work in the anchorage. 

Overnight 27 May 1982, the newly formed technical team from Intrepid working with Argonaut’s engineering team and FCDT1 made good progress cutting an access route through the ship. 

FCDT3 now lost their technical team for a higher priority task, that of welding repairs onboard Sir Galahad in order to get her back into service, a higher priority.  This left FCDT3 to pad and secure Sir Lancelot’s UXB prior to the ship being towed to a remote location before the bomb could be moved.  That afternoon and while resting and catching up on domestics ashore, FCDT3 survived an air raid on Ajax Bay that killed 4 personnel and injured 20 others. 

FCDT1 continued to prepare the rigging of the Argonaut UXB and, following hole cutting operations through the ship, began to move the bomb through the ship, requiring several days extremely careful work until able to lower it over the side on 28 May 1982.  It was a textbook and well executed EOD operation but had tied up Argonaut for seven days.  Lieutenant Commander Dutton had previously been awarded a Queens Gallantry Medal for EOD work in UK, he was now to be awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his sustained and resolute leadership throughout the operation.

Temporarily patched up, Argonaut was sent to the Tug, Repair and Logistics Area (TRALA) a couple of hundred miles to the East and out of the AAF’s range for attention by the Fleet Maintenance Unit repair teams onboard the MV Stena Seaspread.  The temporary patching applied at San Carlos was found to have failed and Argonaut had taken onboard hundreds of tons of sea water.  FCDT2 then came to the fore and, with the benefit of unusually calm conditions such that the two ships could lie alongside each other, was able to effect a more substantial underwater patch repair.  Argonaut was pumped out and her sea worthiness was restored.

On 29 May FCDT3 countermined UXBs from the previous day’s raid at Ajax Bay, working alongside a RAF EOD team, before continuing with the removal of Sir Lancelot’s UXB.  After considerable cutting of holes through the ship and extensive rigging work by Lieutenant Bruen, FCDT3 with great care removed the bomb off the ship and over the side to the seabed.  This was to be the last of the UXBs.

On this occasion the team had been led by Chief Petty Officer (Diver) Graham Trotter who was subsequently gazetted for the Distinguished Service Medal while Lieutenant Bruen was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.  All in FCDT3 subsequently received public recognition. The Leading Divers were Mentioned in Despatches while others received Commander Task Force Commendations. 

Meanwhile ashore and without sufficient helicopter availability following the Exocet attack on and loss of the MV Atlantic Conveyor, 3 Commando Brigade had ‘yomped’ and ‘tabbed’ itself the 50 miles across East Falkland to go firm to the north west of Port Stanley but needed more immediate access to support.  It became important to establish a Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA) closer to the Brigade but mining of the access route through San Salvador to Teal inlet was a clear possibility.  Attention was now given to using the adhoc Assault Influence Minesweeping System Mk 1 to explore the inlet for mines. 

In darkness on 30 May 1982 two of the smaller landing craft (LCVP) were launched from Intrepid at the entrance to San Salvador inlet to deploy their improvised and unproven and improvised shallow water magnetic and acoustic influence sweeps.  The LCVP’s were commanded by Lieutenant Commander Bruce Mackay, (MCD) with his 2-i-c, the irrepressible Chief Petty Officer (Mine Warfare) Bryan ‘Bill’ Hayley in charge of the second landing craft.  Each LCVP was crewed by a Royal Marine Coxswain and specialist mine warfare junior ratings.  No mines were actuated, even after several runs up and down the inlet, to the great relief of those manning the craft.  That result would now ensure Landing Ship Logistic (LSL) access and the setting up of the forward BMA at Teal.  Lieutenant Commander Mackay and the two Royal Marine Coxswains were subsequently Mentioned in Despatches for their part in this hazardous operation with an unproven system that could well have ended in the loss of both landing craft and their crews.

It was now time to call forward three of the requisitioned Hull trawlers, designated Mine Sweepers Auxiliary (MSA), from South Georgia that had been carrying out stores cross decking operations as part of the logistic support train.  Working from San Carlos by night only, their role would be to carry out minesweeping operations in support of the battle for Stanley; inserting and resupplying special forces to and from Argentine held territory; and supporting the two Fleet Clearance Diving Teams.  

Confidence was required that no mining had taken place in an area in Berkeley Sound to the northwest of Stanley as identified for use by escorts conducting Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) operations.  Being noisy and made of steel, the MSAs were of course wholly unsuited for influence minesweeping use and highly vulnerable. The risk of loss if mines were detonated was extremely high. However, the loss of one or two trawlers was infinitely preferable to the loss of a higher value unit such as a frigate. 

HMS Pict was the only trawler then present to be fitted with an acoustic sweep.  Those earmarked for Cordella and Junella were still following them around the South Atlantic in a ship somewhere.  Half of Pict’s ship’s company transferred across to Cordella at the entrance to Berkeley Sound where Cordella stood by to assist in the event Pict was damaged by a mine explosion.  Fortunately no mines were encountered and Lieutenant Commander David Garwood, commanding HMS Pict, was subsequently Mentioned in Despatches for using his ship as a ‘Guinea Pig’ to complete the task when the ships acoustic sweep failed early in the mission.

The trawlers frequently ran the risk of collision or being fired on by both enemy and friendly forces as they operated alone and by night; their radar and communications silent and all lights including navigation lights extinguished to hide from watching eyes,.  There were several close encounters with own forces, each previously unaware of the presence of the other and then, following the night influence sweep of Berkeley Sound, came a British intelligence report indicating there had been a radio discussion in Spanish that the two small radar targets were of insufficient value for the shore mounted Argentine Exocet missile battery. Being small sometimes works in your favour.

Soundings on charts of the islands that dated back over 100 years were notoriously unreliable close in.  All three grounded at some point during their nocturnal operations providing heart stopping moments yet none sustained serious damage.  Again, risks were being taken with people’s lives.

When Argentine forces surrendered on 14 June Lieutenant Commander Meatyard, who had been coordinating the tasking of minesweepers and the inshore Clearance Diving Teams alike on behalf of the Amphibious Task Group Commander, flew immediately to Stanley by helicopter to find the Argentine officer responsible for executing the defensive sea minefields off Port Stanley.  He was thus able to secure the minefield chart and debrief those responsible to discover what we were up against. 

Next he identified the routes into Ports William/Stanley needing to be explored to ensure no mining had occurred there.  This was executed by the three MSAs on 16/17 June that streamed their Oropesa sweeps immediately following there arrival off Stanley having steamed at full belt from San Carlos, yet not before the SS Canberra had preceded them into Port William, the outer harbour for Port Stanley.

A few days later and now restored to their full complement of five with the arrival of Northella and Farnella from South Georgia, the MSA’s began the live minefield clearance operation.  Between 22 June and 4 July, when the southern winter weather allowed, the trawlers progressed their wire sweeps though the two enemy minefields in the Oropesa configuration.  Cordella led the formation, each ship using their sweeps to protect the next in line.  The first mine was swept by Pict, second in line just as a helicopter was dropping mail and stores onto her bridge wing.  The mine surfaced in front of Northella that took urgent avoiding action as did Farnella astern of Northella.  Junella had ample time to get clear, recovered her sweeps and sank the mine by small arms fire.  Over a period of three days the Squadron swept a total of 10 mines; Pict totalled three, Northella swept two, Junella four, and Farnella one.  Pict’s third mine was recovered for intelligence purposes by Lieutenant Bruen working with Chief Petty Officer (Mine Warfare) ‘Tex’ Marshall and Leading Seaman (Mine Warfare) Nick Smith from HMS Junella in atrocious Antarctic winter weather. 

The mine was beached subsequently at Fitzroy where Lieutenant Bruen rendered it safe, again working without proper EOD tools, supported by Chief Petty Officer (Diver) Graham Trotter and Leading Seaman (Diver) Anthony Thompson of FCDT3.  This mine was subsequently returned to UK for analysis onboard Junella.  All of the other nine mines swept were sunk by small arms fire. 

The brand new mine hunters HM Ships Brecon and Ledbury arrived in theatre on the same day the trawlers completed an exhaustive check sweeping operation.  This time the trawlers had used their EDATS gear in a multi ship bottom following team sweep formation, aimed at sweeping those mines on a short tether.  Had the mine hunters not been available with their sonar to prosecute the minefield for sunken mines and others that had not deployed properly, a drag sweep utilising anchor cable between two sweep wires would have been deployed to disrupt the married failures.  

In subsequent clear up operations by the mine hunters, many of the remaining mines were found to have failed to operate, presumed to have flooded prematurely and were destroyed remotely.  Others were not found and were presumed to have drifted away and sunk.

The Fleet Clearance Diving Teams were now relieved by others from UK and flew home.  The 11th Mine Countermeasures Squadron was relieved too but by the infinitely more capable Brecon and Ledbury.  The trawlers sailed from Port Stanley on 13 July and headed directly for Gibraltar to allow the 141 men a break, most of whom had not stepped ashore for nearly four months.  Some bought post cards, some a decent haircut and one or two might have sampled a local beer or two.

On 11 August the ships arrived back at Rosyth to find friends and family waiting to welcome them on the dockside. 

It was good to be home but in part it was a sad day too, the team would now be broken up and sent to other ships and establishments.  The White Ensigns were hauled down as the ships were decommissioned and handed back to their owners with grateful thanks, both ships and men much the better for the experience.

The mine swept off Port Stanley by HMS Pict was brought to UK onboard HMS Junella for investigation and years later in 2007 was exhibited at the Imperial War Museum as part of the Falklands 25 Exhibition. 

A memorial to the 11 MCM Squadron is now displayed in the Admiralty public house at Trafalgar Square in London and many former colleagues meet up at the annual Seafarers weekend each April in Kingston Upon Hull from where their ships originated. 

(From FaceBook: Seeing that photo reminds me of a mate of mine that was a Tiff on one of the "ellas".He recounted the tale of transferring troops from QE2 in South Georgia and as their little ship drew close to the towering liner, they radioed "Permission to come alongside, port side aft". This was during a busy period of ships coming and going with stores & personnel. They got a distracted response from the QE2, "Approved, port aft. Which ship are you again?” to which the little ship replied “Farnella. Which ship are you?”)

More about the 11th MCM Squadron

11th MCM Squadron on Facebook

Royal Navy Clearance Divers in the Falklands 1982.

Roughers off Port Stanley - more Falklands “Dits”

Find out more about modern Minesweepers, Mine Hunters, Diving Teams and ongoing operations here.

FORMATION OF THE MCM HQ CELL DURING THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN

A personal account by Lieutenant ‘George’ Turnbull Royal Navy

In 1982 I was a newly promoted CPO (Mine Warfare), minding my own business in a quiet number onboard HMS Victory in Portsmouth Dockyard when General Galtieri decided to invade the Falkland Islands.

After some 27 months sea time onboard the good ship, HMS Kirkliston I had been promoted to CPO (MW), and was enjoying some well-earned shore and family time while carrying out the duties of Chief Boatswain’s Mate onboard HMS Victory, Admiral Lord Nelson’s flagship and a permanent fixture of Portsmouth Dockyard. I thought life couldn’t get much better.

Then in early April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and in doing so, burst my little bubble.  Like the rest of the country, I had of course been watching the buildup on the television news but felt quite comfortable in my cushy little draft.  They wouldn’t want HMS Victory now, would they?

Not the Victory, but me !  The First Lieutenant called me into his cabin and said , “I’m afraid I’ve got some news for you George. You have a short notice draft to HMS Intrepid, the LPD assault ship”.  I thought What !  Don’t they know that I am a mine warfare specialist, so what would I do in Intrepid? This was on the Wednesday. Off I went to barracks to collect drafting/travel instructions and to be issued with a mountain of cold weather and camouflage clothing. I was then advised that the ship had already sailed and I would fly out and join her at Ascension Island.

On Friday, I was to travel by train to RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire, stay overnight and get a Hercules C130 flight to Ascension early Saturday.  My wife and two daughters bid me a tearful farewell, having dropped me at Portsmouth Harbour station. 

To my surprise, there stood another CPO (MW) whom I knew well, Dennis Volley.  He had exactly the same joining/travel instructions as me and we were both confused.

At that time, neither of us was aware of developments that had taken place in the MCM Flotilla with the take up from trade of the five trawlers, to be manned by MCM-trained Royal Navy crews and designated as the 11th Mine Countermeasures Squadron.

Anyway, it was good to have a travelling companion.  After an uncomfortable and sleepless night in the transit accommodation at Lyneham, we boarded the flight to Ascension. 

As you can imagine, the aircraft was absolutely chocker, with essential stores and a variety of service personnel from all three services; all required in support of the war effort. 

Eventually, after a tiring nine-hour flight we arrived at Ascension Island and humped our mountain of kit to the reception tent, only to be told that the fleet had sailed the day before. We were issued with a camp bed, a sleeping bag and were driven with a bus load of others to an abandoned hut and told to await further instructions.   We still had no idea what would be expected of us.  We did get a slight inkling, when stretching our legs around the island, we noticed five large, rusty trawlers anchored in the bay.  The penny half-dropped.

The next day, we were advised that we would be taking passage onboard RFA Tidespring that had just arrived from South Georgia with the Argentine prisoners, marines and scrap metal merchants, and would be sailing to the Falklands with fuel, ammunition and essential stores.  We hauled our kit to the airfield and were directed to a helicopter that took us out to the ship.  It was good to be in familiar territory and at last have a shower and eat food that didn’t come in a brown paper bag. 

While on passage, and at the Chief Officer’s request we carried out a full inventory and inspection of the ship’s portable, firefighting equipment; replacing missing or damaged hoses, recharging dud fire extinguishers etc.  We gave demonstrations on their use to refresh the relatively inexperienced crew for which the Chief Officer was very grateful.

Clearly, with her fuel and ammunition cargo, Tidespring could not be risked in the war zone and we were transferred by helicopter to the RFA Sir Tristram that had been sent to collect stores and ammunition for transfer ashore.  We sailed overnight into San Carlos Water and disembarked with at least another dozen assorted personnel into one of Intrepid’s landing craft for the short journey across.

Intrepid seemed to be an absolute mayhem of people and stores.  The main passageways were filled with boxes of tinned vegetables which we had to walk over.  Arriving at the Regulating Office, we were just about to be processed when the pipe was made

“Air Raid Warning Red, Hands to Action Stations”.

In the short space of time that she had been there the ship had already been subject to a couple of air raids and everyone knew exactly what to do and where to go, except us new joiners. 

The Reg Office emptied in an instant, as did the main passageways.  We befuddled lot took shelter where we could and prayed.  As you can imagine, there was a lot of noise and gunfire as the attacking aircraft flew over and then a period of silence.  For us, who could see and hear nothing, we could only imagine what was hurtling out of the sky, towards us, thankfully nothing but it did make one check one’s underwear!  The All Clear was soon sounded and within minutes everything just carried on as normal and we finally and formally joined HMS Intrepid.

We were directed to our mess and greeted by my old friend, CPO (MW) Derek Ridley.  We had served together before as junior rates in HMS Forth, the submarine depot ship way back in the 1960s.  Derek quickly explained that we were to form an MCM cell, looking out for the trawlers which had been taken up from trade and were on their way down from Ascension Island and that’s when the other half of the penny dropped.  We were introduced to the other members of the team: Lieutenant Commander Chris Meatyard (MCD)  i/c and Lieutenant Alex Manning (MCD), 2 i/c.

The MCM Cell had been set up in the former Cadets’ Gun Room, which was in fact the Wardroom Annexe.  Alex Manning and Derek Ridley had done an excellent job of setting up the cell.  Dennis and I read ourselves in, then studied the local charts to assess where we would have laid any minefields had we been the Argentine mining officers.  Fairly soon we settled into a routine and prepared for the arrival of the trawlers.

Air raid warnings announcing an imminent attack were a regular occurrence during this period.  The wardroom had been set up as the emergency sick bay and operating theatre.  On each occasion when the warning was piped over the main broadcast, we had to evacuate.  It was decided that our action station would be in Lieutenant Manning’s cabin for two reasons: 

(1)  We didn’t actually have an Action Station.

(2)  Intrepid had been laid up in reserve prior to the conflict and had been manned at very short notice.  Her crew had come from a variety of locations and had not got to know each other as yet.  Thus if someone went missing it was highly likely it would go unnoticed for some considerable time.

It might sound a bit of a doddle holing up in a cabin during the many Argentine air raids but we could hear very little and see nothing of what was going on.  We would hear a sudden roar of aircraft somewhere above us and ask ours or theirs?  The noise would last only a few seconds and then, silence. We then waited for whatever was coming our way, more underwear checks !

It was during the ‘cabin gatherings’ onboard Intrepid that we met the other member of the MCM team in the form of our old colleague, former Royal Yachtsman CPO (MW) Bryan ‘Bill’ Hayley who, along with Lieutenant Commander Bruce McKay (MCD), had embarked in Intrepid with an innovative bit of kit called the Assault Mine Sweeping System, Mark 1. 

Here was a typical example of make do in that the kit had been hurriedly cobbled together in UK.  The system comprised a long rectangular box filled with huge bar magnets to be supported by floats plus an underwater noisemaker called a Hydrosounder with its own float.  This adhoc shallow water influence minesweeping system was to be towed from the stern of a LCVP.  Bill, in his usual ebullient style described the action of this thing with considerable enthusiasm.  I remember thinking that it sounded like a suicide job to me but who was I to burst Bill’s bubble. 

My thinking was reinforced some days later when I watched Bruce and Bill disappear into the mists off Port Salvador, embarked in two LCVPs driven by two brave Royal Marine coxswains towing these contraptions behind them.  Had they set off a typical ground mine there would have been nothing left to bury, and all they were wearing for protection was camouflage clothing, tin hats and life jackets ! Thankfully, they came back unharmed.

Much later I read of personnel getting medals for all sorts of dangerous exploits and, in my humble opinion, these two should have got the biggest gongs going for bravery.  Lieutenant Commander Bruce McKay and the two Royal Marine coxswains were subsequently awarded Mentions in Dispatches while ‘Bill’ Haley received the characteristic “Well done Chief!”

[By Martyn Holloway:  I knew ‘Bill’ Haley from when he undertook the very first Petty Officer (Mine Warfare) course at HMS Vernon in 1975 and had the great pleasure of working with him on a four month training project for the US Navy in 1978.  He is of course a former Royal Yachtsman and that alone establishes the high quality and character of the man.  Years later after the Falklands Conflict we met briefly in passing.  He took my hand firmly and with a characteristic twinkle in his eye proclaimed “You know Sir, there are not many of us heroes left you know.” That was the last time I saw him.]

On 2nd June we witnessed the cruise liner Canberra anchoring in San Carlos.  She had been requisitioned as a troop ship and had already taken part in the initial landings there on 23rd May.  Now she brought 1st Bn Welsh and 2nd Bn Scots Guards of 5 Infantry Brigade that the five trawlers had transferred across from QE2 in South Georgia to take part in the assault on Stanley that was expected to happen in a few days’ time. 

The Royal Marines and Paras of 3 Commando Brigade had gone ashore in the initial landings at San Carlos but their advance on Stanley had been severely hampered by the loss of the MV Atlantic Conveyor with its precious cargo of helicopters.  The Royal Marines had instead “yomped” to their initial objectives while the Paras had “tabbed” to theirs.  

The Guards regiments took a while to get ashore and had then dug in but got totally soaked, along with all their kit. There then followed a huge effort to bring them back to the two LPDs Fearless and Intrepid. We were all involved in getting them into the ship and I well remember we had bedraggled soldiers lying in passageways with their wet kit hanging off every hook available in an attempt to get it dry.  The powers that be then decided that the two LPDs would up anchor and take the Guards around to Bluff Cove.  We were underway when it was decided that to venture out into what had become known as “Exocet Alley“ was too big a threat to these major assets.   Thank goodness the decision was rescinded and we returned to San Carlos.

Two RFAs, Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad were brought alongside each of the LPDs and we all assisted with embarkation of the troops into them respectively.  They then took on the task of ferrying the troops to Bluff Cove.  The outcome of that trip is now well known.

In the meantime, three of the five trawlers had arrived and were immediately tasked on various night time activities around enemy held territory.  Although we were not involved in tasking them at this stage, we were of course aware of their movements and followed them carefully.  We would catch sight of them at anchor in San Carlos during the daylight hours following their nocturnal activities. 

Argentine Forces surrendered on 14th June. Things then started to move pretty quickly,

Intrepid’s Commander wanted to return his Wardroom back to normal fairly sharply and promptly threw us out of the Annexe. Then we were hurriedly transferred by Chinook Helicopter from Intrepid to Fearless, humping not only our personal kit but all the MCM cell equipment as well.

Chris Meatyard promptly grabbed a lift by helicopter to Stanley on an intelligence gathering mission and managed to track down the Argentine officers responsible for laying the minefields.  Very obligingly, they handed over their chart that quite clearly indicated the moored mine positions laid in two areas. We were just about to set up the cell again when it was decided that the naval contribution was now complete and that supporting all these vessels was putting too much strain on the infrastructure of the Islands; the LPDs would leave at the earliest opportunity.  Our job was just starting, so guess what?  Off we went again!

Humping our kit once more, we disembarked to shore.  Derek, Dennis and I were to be accommodated onboard the RFA Sir Bedivere.

She had suffered bomb damage to her bow and had been brought alongside in Port Stanley to undergo repairs. Her accommodation areas were fine and that was where we ended up.  The officers were temporarily relocated to Government House.

The trawlers had been carrying out other tasks elsewhere but were now on their way to Port Stanley, so we had to move pretty quickly to be in a position to task them when they arrived.  It was decided that the local school that had been requisitioned by the Argentines would be set up as a temporary HQ for the shore side staff.  Chris Meatyard despatched we three to the school to secure a room and set up the MCM cell, again!

Argentine troops had been using the school as an accommodation centre and it was in a shocking state; full of discarded ration packs and all the other detritus of unlawful occupation and a powerful smell of urine.  There were other RN elements also vying for space but we managed to secure a good sized room.  We set about cleaning it up, found some discarded, unbroken furniture and by the end of the day it was clean, scrubbed out and looking fairly presentable.  We felt quite pleased with ourselves and started thinking of getting our equipment along.  Wrong! 

The newly appointed Queens Harbour Master for Port Stanley had just arrived from UK and was also looking for a place to set up. He saw our newly cleaned office, pulled rank and promptly requisitioned it. We had to start again and ended up in something not much bigger than a broom cupboard.

Nevertheless, we got on with it and were soon in a position to be able to support the trawlers on their arrival in Port Stanley.  Derek Ridley was by far the best administrator between us three and relished all the planning and paperwork involved in the running of an MCM cell.  So along with Chris Meatyard and Alex Manning he remained in the office mostly, while Dennis and I took on the role of Squadron Chiefs, I suppose that is the best way of describing it.

We would collect stores for the ships and that would involve runs out to the airport in any vehicle we could requisition at the time.  We went sea riding too from time to time in each of the trawlers, usually joining them via helicopter transfer, not a pleasant experience.

I recall one such occasion when I was being lowered down and the seas were quite rough.  It was extremely cold and I was dressed like an Eskimo in all my cold weather clothing.  The deck kept appearing and then disappearing to be replaced by cold, black water.  I remember thinking to myself, if this harness snaps, I won’t stop until I hit the bottom, perhaps a 100 metres down but then welcome hands grabbed me and all was well.

Using the chart that the Argentines had kindly provided, the trawlers had been set to work.  Precise navigation was going to be achieved by the use of this new-fangled device called Decca HiFix.   Transponders had been sited on the hill tops around Port Stanley and the ships had been fitted with receivers.  One of the transponders that was set literally on the very peak of one hill was powered by 24 volt, Auto Bus batteries.  The other transponder was on more level ground and had power supplied via a portable generator and batteries.  The batteries had to be changed and the generators topped up with fuel respectively, every two days.  Navigational accuracy was crucial to the safety of the trawlers and it was essential that this task was carried out without fail. 

The only way to reach these peaks was by helicopter and that fell to the MCM Cell to organise and make it happen.  It was hard physical work in the cold weather but absolutely essential.

First of all we had to get the batteries and fuel cans to the flight deck for loading into the helicopter, no easy task on Sir Bedivere. Getting the batteries on and off the helicopters was not our only problem.  Just convincing the ship’s crew that the job was essential was a challenge on its own.  The Chinese electrician's mate, i/c of the battery shop, was the most elusive of characters.  We always seemed to have trouble finding him.  We then had to convince him how critically important it was for the trawlers that the batteries had to be fully charged and ready within the next 48 hours.  Such was our concern as to whether they would be ready, one of us would visit the battery shop the next day to ensure the task was being done. 

On changeover day, we would track him down first thing in the morning and get the batteries to the flight deck, ready for the transfer.  His call was always, "Too busy, Too busy". As you may imagine, he didn't get much sympathy.

The fun bit came at the other end where we were lowered down onto the snow covered peaks, again dressed as Eskimos.  First job was to detach the spent batteries.  They had to be hauled up, new ones sent down, connections made and tested and then we would be hauled up again and onto the next one.  Sometimes, we would get a brave pilot who would put one wheel onto the ledge and align the door parallel with the transponder so that we could just hop out, do the job and hop back in again.  It was an all-day task, at the end of which we were tired, cold, wet and hungry but felt we were contributing and were very much aware that it was vital for those in the minefields. 

Being ‘sprog’ Chiefs i.e. newly qualified, the task normally fell to Dennis and me, although on occasion Alex Manning took a turn.  We must have done a pretty good job and I think the ships were happy with our efforts, as is shown in a note from MCM 11 which was passed on to me by Chris Meatyard.

For some reason I have kept it all this time, maybe because of the promise of that ‘beer in the fridge’ – which I have yet to collect …

(Note By Martyn Holloway;  George and Dennis Volley took advantage of helicopter mail runs to the trawlers to come out and visit us while we were in the minefields. My memory doesn’t recall too much detail, although apparently I told George to make sure he got someone to give him a hard hat in case we struck a mine.  I think I was focused on other things like live mines, making sure we were in safe water, getting the turns right and monitoring the other ships. 

The note was hand written by Cordella’s Navigator, Lieutenant Martin Kent, Royal Navy following a brief discussion on VHF with Lieutenant Tony Jenks, Royal Navy, a Hydrographic specialist serving in Junella with experience of the precise navigation equipment that had failed. 

A helo taking the resupply team out to replace the batteries on the transponders had inadvertently blown a transponder over as it departed, leaving us navigationally blind in the minefield.  Our back up was a highly dodgy parallel index on the fairway buoy about three miles away, so life was a bit exciting for the remainder of that lap.  We needed to get Tony Jenks our tame ‘Droggy’ ashore quickly and up the appropriate hill to reboot the transponder, hence the note. )

The ships worked tirelessly, ploughing up and down the minefields and, while they didn’t manage to sweep all the mines that had been laid, they achieved the required level of confidence that the area was clear. 

The trawlers finished their clearance operation and a few days into July we were told by Chris Meatyard that it was all over and we were not needed anymore.  We were delighted of course and turned our thoughts to getting home, however we couldn’t just up sticks and walk out, there had to be a handover.   

In the next couple of days CPO (MW) ‘Mitch’ Mitchell, flew out from the UK and joined the team.  We did a quick turnover with him including the transponder maintenance.  He did not like flying in helicopters and I took great joy in almost pushing him out the door to get him on the appropriate peak.

Then we were done.  Alex Manning, Derek, Dennis and I were to fly out on a C130 Hercules to Ascension, and then onto UK.  After about 8 hours, we got to Ascension OK, it was good to feel the warmth.  We had a couple of hour’s holdover and then finally we were on our way home, still humping that goddamned kit.

We arrived at Lyneham in the early morning and after processing through military arrivals, had a happy reunion with our respective families, said our goodbyes to each other then headed for home.

It didn’t end there. In my absence another CPO had taken over my cushy billet onboard Victory and I ended up in the Captain Weapons Trials Team as a Sea Rider on the new Hunt Class MCMVs, trialling their new influence sweeps. 

Oh well, at least I got a medal and, of course, it could have been a whole lot worse.

Find out more about modern Minesweepers, Mine Hunters, Diving Teams and ongoing operations here.

HMS ANTELOPE AND THE ROYAL ENGINEERS

by Rob Hoole

On 23rd May 1982, the Army Royal Engineers team of Warrant Officer (later Capt) John Phillips and Staff Sergeant Jim Prescott was tasked with rendering safe two 1,000 lb bombs on board the Type 21 frigate HMS ANTELOPE which had been hit in Saint Carlos Water while providing anti-aircraft cover for the amphibious force. 

The first bomb was not accessible pending the removal of extensive debris. The second bomb had a damaged fuze and was in the more dangerous condition. Acting in accordance with accepted procedures which they had earlier employed effectively for a bomb on board ARGONAUT, the team made three unsuccessful attempts to remove the fuze remotely. A fourth attempt, using different equipment, resulted in the bomb exploding.

ANTELOPE was torn open from waterline to funnel, with the blast starting major fires in both engine rooms, which spread very quickly. The starboard fire main was fractured, the ship lost all electrical power and the Commanding Officer, Cdr Nick Tobin, gave the order to abandon ship. Tobin was the last person to leave the ship.

Although a blast route of open doors and hatches had been prepared, a fully fastened door at the forward end of the passageway where they stood was completely blown off. Staff Sgt Prescott died instantly and WO II Phillips sustained serious injuries including the loss of his left arm. 

ANTELOPE was wracked by a series of massive explosions and started to burn from end to end, her lightweight aluminium structure melting in the intense heat. She was still floating overnight but broke in half and sank the following day.

For their actions, Staff Sgt Prescott was awarded the Royal Navy's Conspicuous Gallantry Medal posthumously. WO II Philips was awarded the Royal Navy's Distinguished Service Cross.

MINE WARFARE, DIVING AND EOD OPERATIONS DURING THE Falkland Islands Conflict (Operation CORPORATE 1982) - ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

by Captain Chris O’Flaherty Royal Navy

From “Naval Minewarfare: Politics to Practicalities” by Captain Chris O’Flaherty, Royal Navy. Very slightly amended by Martyn Hollaway, who was there. (The writing of this publication was partially funded by the Guy Hudson Memorial Trust). 

On 2 April 1982, an Argentine naval force led by the Aircraft Carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo conducted Operation ROSARIO, a bold amphibious assault onto the poorly defended Falkland Islands, landing unopposed on a beach just north of the main airport at Stanley. They eventually overcame the defensive efforts of sixty Royal Marines who were ordered by the Island’s Governor, Sir Rex Hunt, to lay down their arms, ceding Government House and thus control of the Islands to the invaders. The British had been exposed as having no substantive plans for the defence of the Islands, despite being a major world military power whose arsenal included thousands of naval mines.

At the political level, the Argentine intent was to force a negotiated settlement over sovereignty. The British position, refined in the immediate aftermath of the Argentine invasion, was that British sovereignty must continue and British administration of the Islands be restored. Argentine withdrawal became a pre-condition to any further negotiations and the British would not negotiate under duress.

Consolidating their occupation of their new territory, Argentine forces focussed their defence on the area around the Island’s only town (population 1,050) with about 1,000 defending troops establishing infantry and artillery positions on the high ground surrounding the coastal capital. In the days immediately after their successful assault this appears to have been in accordance with traditional military practice more than a genuine attempt to create a militarily impregnable bastion.

Despite an immediate UN Security Council Resolution calling for Argentine withdrawal the invaders did not expect the British to respond with force and thus it was with some surprise that they had to react to news initially of a naval task force being assembled in the UK, the subsequent declaration on 7 April 1982 by the British government of a maritime exclusion zone around the Islands, and then news of a British nuclear submarine, HMS Spartan, arriving off the Islands coincident with the activation of the exclusion zone. Fearful of losing ships and supplies to the menace of a submarine torpedo attack, from 12 April 1982 Argentina’s primary method of resupply to the Islands became by air; this almost completely removed options for the provision of additional heavy stores and meant the Island’s occupying forces had to make the most of what they had already received. In the case of naval mines, this was a meagre supply of twenty-two home-produced type 1925 moored contact mines, despite their stockpiles back on their mainland including 180 buoyant and 220 ground mines of British origin, many of which had recently been serviced by British contractors.

The initial British assessment of Argentine mining was relatively accurate, expecting Argentine forces to target the UK nuclear submarine, especially in the vicinity of Port Stanley. It assessed the Argentines would lay three minefields off Port Stanley, with ‘a paper minefield’ (i.e. a ruse) declared between the north-west and south-west of the Falklands and the Argentine mainland in order to guard reinforcements transiting Argentine shipping routes. Unbeknown to the British, the Argentine lack of mines made the ‘paper minefield’ more conjectural than they at the time understood, but it also led to an initial complacency among military planners of the potential effect of naval mining on the intended British assault; this meant the task force already en route south did not include any mine countermeasures capability.

A pre-emptive escalation of the minewarfare battle occurred on 11 April, when the Argentines passed information to US Secretary of State Haig, who was acting as peace envoy, for transmission to the British government:

“Argentine Foreign Minister [or Foreign Ministry] has informed me that mines have been laid around the Falklands and South Georgia and a warning to navigators will be issued. Warning will state that any vessel moving in Falklands or South Georgia should pick up a pilot to enter Cumberland Bay or at St Peter’s Island in South Georgia where pilot can be picked up at Port Grytviken.

Argentines know that we are passing this information to you.”

On 15 April 1982 the Argentine supply ship Islas de Los Estados then laid two small defensive minefields off Port Stanley, using a total twenty-one moored contact mines. The minefields had been planned by Argentine Lieutenant Commander Pazarola and consisted of four rows of between four and seven mines, laid between seven and nine cables (1,400 to 1,800 yards) apart with a case depth of 6 metres below the surface. Militarily these were token minefields designed to harass attackers rather than prevent the now expected British frontal assault on Stanley, but they were the best that could be achieved with the limited mine stocks assigned to the invasion forces.

Monitoring this minelay was the British submarine HMS Spartan. Whilst carrying out surveillance operations to the east of Port Stanley, the submarine had sighted the Argentine support vessels Cabo San Antonio and Islas de Los Estados carrying out possible mine-laying operations. Her Rules of Engagement at the time did not allow her to sink them, despite clear evidence of belligerence, including concurrent signals intelligence that the minelayer had asked permission to ‘dump’ a defective mine (which the British later learnt had suffered damage to its horns whilst being prepared for laying).

This clear evidence of Argentine naval mining galvanised the British into reconsidering the minewarfare threat to their operations, as well as reappraisal of the opportunities for UK mining. The initial underestimation of the threat from mines was highlighted by the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff’s comment on 1 May 1982 when he stated that: ‘I agree with [Director of Naval Warfare] that the potential Argentine mining threat is now somewhat greater than originally assessed. Hard intelligence indicates a limited use of mines in the Port Stanley approaches.’

By 20 April 1982 five British Trawlers had been requisitioned to serve as minesweepers. The British fleet of ‘Ton’ class costal minesweepers and mine hunters were too small and fragile to attempt the 8,000-mile journey. Thus the wartime contingency of using fishing boats was reinvigorated; in this case deep-sea trawlers. Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Martyn Holloway Royal Navy, a minewarfare and clearance diving specialist (MCD) in HMS Cordella, the newly formed 11th Mine Countermeasures Squadron was outfitted in Rosyth Dockyard with mechanical minesweeping equipment, focussed on team minesweeping.  Three were also equipped with an acoustic hammer influence minesweep; the other two were fitted for but their acoustic units were not then available and would later follow them around the South Atlantic.

After a short work-up period, they departed from the UK on 27 April 1982, conducting minesweeping drills almost every day on their passage south in order to refine their procedures, efficiency and station-keeping. By the time of their arrival at Ascension Island (halfway to the Falklands) they had devised the optimum tactics to counter the expected threat, focussed on a four-ship formation Oropesa minesweep with the fifth ship in the mine-guard station to dispose of swept mines. Although still awaiting some equipment, time was now of the essence, so on 13 May they continued south with their remaining minesweeping stores ‘in the post’. Three days and 600 miles later, they received five sets of specially manufactured slings by parachute-airdrop that would permit an echelon formation to be used and protect the minesweepers against mines close to the surface. The airdrop included five copies of the previous day’s morale-boosting Sun newspaper hidden in the packaging by their friends back in Rosyth.

Fearful of Argentine minelaying in the vicinity of their amphibious landings, British scientists at Portland had concurrently developed an influence minesweeping capability – the Assault Minesweeping System Mark 1 – that was also deployed via Ascension Island.  Consisting of noisemakers and a string of powerful magnets suspended under floats, it was embarked in the assault ship HMS Intrepid ready to be employed by the Amphibious Task Force, towed behind her small landing craft (LCVPs). A further option of towing noisemakers behind Wessex helicopters had on 5 May been trialled but dismissed as operationally unproven and too risky – the pilots also proving none too enthusiastic, especially when told they would be minesweeping at night. The British had thus in only four weeks created a significant minesweeping capability that bore almost no semblance to that with which they had trained for the many years of the Cold War, but one which many involved knew would leave them highly exposed to the by-now feared concerted Argentine mining campaign.

In parallel with their MCM preparations, the British also considered the laying of mines to support their operations. After discounting the few-thousand mines held at readiness for the UK Defensive Mining Plan, they had 2,660 mines available for operations in the South Atlantic, with various choices of mine-laying platform driving precisely how many could be used. Conventional minelaying from ships taken up from trade was untenable off the occupied Islands, with British options limited to submarine and air-laid minefields.

Analysis of these minefield options was initially stymied by a wag in the Ministry of Defence who debunked the first attempt at creating workable military solutions. Tasked to investigate ‘defensive’ and ‘protective’ minelaying off the Falklands, thus reflecting a minelayer’s intent to ’defend’ and ‘protect’ what the British rightfully considered as theirs, the man in the Ministry pointed out that ‘you cannot defend what you do not hold’. Having eventually agreed to instead analyse ‘offensive’ mining, the Ministry’s analysis, over seventy-three paragraphs, then set out the futility and political risk of offensive mining of Argentine mainland ports – which was not what was asked for nor expected by the frontline minelaying planners. Even when considering the potential mining of South Georgia, the Ministry stated that ‘If there is unlikely to be any enemy naval units operating in the area of South Georgia there is no point in considering a UK offensive mining operation as part of any reoccupation operation.’ This statement highlights the narrow thinking of the evaluation team who looked at mining purely from the stance of destruction of enemy shipping; the potential messaging and political or psychological impacts being mentioned nowhere.

More enlightened officers did pursue minelaying options, with trials on 10 and 17 May of air-laid minefields using Hercules C-130 transport aircraft. Despite high levels of safety and reasonable accuracy being achieved during the trials, aircraft prioritisation, probably combined with an historic antipathy of aviators to minelaying, saw this option pursued no further.  Aviators often like to see immediate explosions after dropping bombs, rather than the small splash of a mine followed days later by normally unobserved operational effect. However, this capability was kept on file, focussed on the offensive minelaying evaluated above, with it being noted that such a capability ‘offers an effective and rapid means of applying military and economic pressure . . . minelaying their ports would [achieve] considerable effects without the difficulties of taking action against the mainland.’

The British were still unaware that there was no further Argentine mining to consider, due to their limited stocks on the Island and their unwillingness to resupply mines via the now critical Argentine airbridge. The British, however, turned their attention to dealing with what they by now assessed as a possibly considerable threat from mines.

The slow minesweeping trawlers, despatched by the British weeks after the departure of the main Task Force, had yet to catch up with the main force and integrate to full combat readiness. The advance British forces had, in consequence, arrived off the Islands devoid of specialist MCM, thus they had to make do. On the morning of 31 April 1982, HM Ships Glamorgan, Alacrity and Arrow were tasked to bombard the capital, Port Stanley. Commander Christopher Craig, Commanding Officer of HMS Alacrity, recalls that ‘this was the first and last daylight bombardment: there followed a brief and savage introduction to the Argentine Air Force.  As ships were turning slowly away from the gun line together, three MIRAGE IIIs attacked at ultra low level from the north east.’ The British by now knew where the limited minefields were and took precautions accordingly but due to the limited extent of Argentine mining those fields had no effect on the tactical conduct of the battle around Stanley.

The frigate Alacrity continued her relationship with mines when on 10 May she was tasked by the maritime Commander, Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, to act as a guinea-pig minesweeper to ascertain if the chosen British assault area had been mined. With his slow minesweeping trawlers still 4,000 miles away in the Ascension Islands, Admiral Woodward recalls:

 “mine-sweepers and their special equipment I did not have, which meant that I would have to use something else – and the hull of a ship was the only suitable hardware available. The only steel which would go deep enough. . . . It would have to be something cheap and cheerful which I could replace, like a 3000 ton Type 21 Frigate. Like Alacrity. Like expendable Alacrity.”

After a tense telephone call outlining the mission, which Admiral Woodward recalls ‘was Victoria Cross material but, strangely, only if it went wrong’, the recipient set about his preparations. Commander Craig later wrote that his ship was detached from the group 100 miles east of Stanley, proceeding at 25 knots in radio and radar silence under cover of thick fog. ‘At 23:00 Alacrity entered Falkland Sound from the south not without apprehension – most particularly at being a somewhat high priced minesweeper. Tasked ostensibly for reconnaissance and attrition against Argentine supply lines, the ship proceeded at full action stations and in the ultra quiet state without echo sounder running. The four hour passage was timed to guarantee passing the most likely mined choke point assisted by the tidal stream at less than 6 Knots. Transit was uneventful until just after midnight.’ At 00:35, in a position 4 miles south of Swan Island, a radar contact was detected. Alacrity increased speed and at 01:12 engaged with her 4.5 inch gun.  After 6 minutes, 37 rounds of VT and 15 rounds of DA ‘the target exploded in an orange fireball which extended well up into the cloud’. Initially assessed and reported as a potential Argentine minelayer, with the size of the explosion supporting the ship’s thesis, the contact was subsequently confirmed as the Islas de Los Estados, the original Argentine minelayer off Stanley but now a transport ship (of 3,000 tonnes) whose cargo included 325,000 litres of aviation fuel.

With Falkland Sound now assessed as probably mine-free, but with significant niggling doubts based on British disbelief at the lack of sensible Argentine mining (accentuated by the 11 May explosion of the Islas de Los Estados), the Amphibious Force were tasked to make their approach. There was to be no opportunity to deploy the LCVP minesweeping system as the risk of comprising the landing site was considered too high, combined with no reasonable contingency plan in the event of them actually finding mines. The orders to the assault formation were for ships to proceed in line ahead, with each ship following precisely in the wake of the ship before them. In the event of the lead ship detonating a mine, others were to continue towards the beach – the 21 May 1982 assault would go ahead regardless.

This apparent acceptance of the threat from mines should not be taken as meaning it had been disregarded. In all ships, the Ship’s Companies’ were as far as possible kept above the waterline, mine lookouts were posted and in the bows of ships together with a large stock of ‘scare charges’, 1lb blocks of explosive, that a scientist in the UK had determined was sufficient to either sympathetically detonate moored mines or to cause the acoustic circuit of influence mines to enter a dormant phase if they were detonated underwater at two-second intervals as the ship passed harmlessly overhead.

 The lack of Argentine mining in Falkland Sound and the beach approaches allowed the assault to succeed, subsequently under sustained and heavy air attack. Mine threat precautions were still taken by Royal Navy shipping when inshore, thus degrading efficiency as some command judgements continued to be influenced by the possibility of mining. However, this influence diminished over time as confidence grew from the apparent absence of mines around the San Carlos landing zone.

With a beach head established in an area the Argentines never suspected, the British now sought to march towards the capital by land, bypassing the main naval minefields protecting the sea approaches to Stanley, but still with significant concern about flank naval mining of the new British resupply beaches along the Falklands coast.

The requisitioned British minesweepers made their first operational port-call at South Georgia on 27 May 1982.  The local area commander, Captain Nicholas Barker, Royal Navy in HMS Endurance immediately put them to work conducting extensive cross-decking of 5 Infantry Brigade, their stores and ammunition that had all been hastily loaded in the UK and was now required in the Falkland Islands before the final assault on Stanley could begin

Following the loss of the MV Atlantic Conveyor and its cargo of helicopters to an Argentine Exocet attack, 3 Commando Brigade ashore had no option but to march from San Carlos some 50 miles across East Falkland towards Stanley.  It then became important to provide forward support to the Brigade via Teal inlet where mining could have occurred.  In darkness on 30 May 1982 two of the smaller landing craft (LCVP) were launched from Intrepid, each deploying an Assault Influence Minesweeping System Mk 1 to explore the inlet.  Fortunately no mines were found.  Lieutenant Commander Bruce Mackay (MCD) led the team of minewarfare specialist seaman manning the LCVPs and with the two Royal Marine Coxswains he was subsequently Mentioned in Despatches for their part in this hazardous operation.

HM Ships Pict, Cordella and Junella were then called forward to the landing area at San Carlos.  Of the three trawlers present only HMS Pict was fully fitted with an acoustic minesweeping system.  She was tasked with HMS Cordella in support to sweep Berkeley Sound and thus create a safe area for Naval Gunfire Support units to bombard Stanley prior to and during the final land assault. On the evening of 10 June 1982, operating under what the minewarfare community call ‘Directive Charlie’ (which when translated means ‘I accept the loss of a trawler against successful completion of the mission’), she transferred all but fourteen of her crew to HMS Cordella at sea for the duration of the task.

When the electrical supply to Pict’s acoustic hammer failed, her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander David Garwood conscious of the vital importance of the mission immediately ordered his ship to be made as noisy as possible by starting every possible piece of machinery and fully loading the generators to maximise her magnetic signature. In the best traditions of mine countermeasures forces the mission was successful, mainly because the Argentines had not laid mines there.  However, this was not known to Garwood, who received a Mention in Despatches for his leadership and bravery.

Five days later, on 15 June 1982, the Argentines surrendered. While the naval task force stayed on high alert in case hostilities resumed, the Argentines mines remained fully primed and ready to destroy any ship that touched them. Interrogation of Argentine prisoners on 16 June 1982 revealed the very limited extent of their mining, with the Argentines giving full disclosure of their mining plans. The 11th MCM Squadron now came into their own and commenced sweeping the minefields.

With the pressure of time now removed, the minesweeping commander set about optimising his force for their clearance task. He recalls that ‘Of significance, the mine case set depth was 6 metres below the surface . . . one should remember at this point that the trawlers’ draught was 8 metres and that the ships would need to tow the sweep, not push it!’ With accurate navigation of crucial importance, time was taken to set up a shore-based precise navigation system.

The trawlers entered the minefields on Wednesday, 23 June 1982, all five in MCM formation Golf, which maximises safety for all but the lead vessel that remains exposed to the mine threat. Edging carefully towards the declared limit of the minefield, salami slicing successive slithers of water with their wire sweeps, the ships cut their first mine on 24 June. Initially ,swept mines were disposed of by small arms gunfire but then a decision was taken to recover one for exploitation to understand exactly what the Argentines had manufactured.  With typical modesty, the mine disposal officer (Lieutenant Commander Bernie Bruen) opened his diary for 25 June with the understatement:

“An interesting day. Helo’d out to Cordella sweeping in the minefields . . . Second mine swept was for recovery . . . Buffer [the inflatable boat coxswain] bumped it.  I bailed out”.

Now in the water next to a live mine, he attached a tow to the mine case that was handed on to the mine disposal ship, HMS Junella, to tow it to shelter where Lieutenant Commander Bruen rendered it safe for recovery inboard. It was of a design not seen before; known as ‘Design Type 1925’ it appeared to be based on a German GY mine from World War II but with seven horns and, as later discovered, an adequate sterilisation mechanism that rendered the mine harmless as soon as the mooring wire had been cut.

With details of both mines and minefields now revealed, the total of ten mines swept out of twenty-one laid seemed inadequate. Check sweeps were conducted using the more efficient team sweep procedure, now that those mines dangerous to the minesweepers had been removed, and the minefields were declared cleared on 5 July.  The 11 mines that had not been accounted for were assessed as either having broken free or had failed to deploy correctly.

In order to provide the highest possible level of assurance the British deployed two of their newest minehunters HM Ships Brecon and Ledbury. The ships were recently out of build and were still largely untested on operations. After an 8,000-mile passage they arrived as the trawlers completed their operations and commenced hunting operations off Stanley. They found and disposed of a further eight mine cases which had either remained attached to their sinkers (known as married failures), or had flooded and consequently sunk to the seabed. This left three mines unaccounted for, despite their best efforts. Nothing more could be done by the British and the probabilities of minewarfare were used to justify cessation of the operation.

The mining elements of the 1982 war for the Falkland Islands may be viewed as a lost opportunity for the defenders, Argentina, with the British forces able to circumvent the limited Argentine mining such that it did not adversely affect their overall operations. Having said that, the psychological threat from mining, especially once proved, on many occasions focussed the minds of British commanders and thus distracted from other mission areas. The lack of British mining, especially as a message of intent, can also be viewed as a missed opportunity. The biggest lesson from this conflict, however, is the need to consider mining from the outset, rather than starting the requisition process after the main force had already departed.

Find out more about modern Minesweepers, Mine Hunters, Diving Teams and ongoing operations here. 

MINE WARFARE AND DIVER HONOURS AND AWARDS FOR OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLAntic

Lt Nigel (Bernie)BRUEN RN OIC FCDT 3

DSC awarded in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

During the evening of 25 May 1982, RFA SIR GALAHAD was struck by a 1,000 Ib bomb which failed to explode. Lieutenant Bruen, Officer in Charge Fleet Clearance Diving Team 3 was tasked to effect its removal. The bomb was lodged in a difficult position, surrounded by broken batteries which had splashed acid around the compartment. The decision was taken to raise the bomb to the vehicle deck and dispose of it overboard. This difficult and dangerous task was successfully completed by the team in the early hours of the following day. During the operation, Lieutenant Bruen showed great personal courage and impeccable leadership. 

Subsequently appointed MBE for mine recovery during Operation Harling in Red Sea 1984 while in Command of HMS Gavinton.

Lt Cdr Brian DUTTON QGM RN OIC FCDT 1

DSO awarded in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

During Agentinian air attacks on 21st May 1982 HMS ARGONAUT was struck by a 1000 Ib bomb which did not explode. The bomb caused extensive damage and lodged between two missiles in the forward magazine where it was also surrounded by damaged and extremely dangerous ordnance. Lieutenant Commander Dutton, as Officer in Charge of Fleet Clearance Diving Team 1 was tasked to remove the bomb. He decided that it was too dangerous to defuse in situ. Instead he took the decision to lift the bomb from the magazine and hoist it overboard. The task proved extremely complex and hazardous requiring clearance of ammunition from the magazine and cutting through sections of the ship's structure. The operation took the team seven days during which HMS ARGONAUT came under further air attacks. The slightest jar or disturbance to the precise lifting angle would have resulted in an explosion which would almost certainly have caused the loss of the ship.

In spite of these difficulties the bomb was successfully removed, largely due to the skill and ingenuity of Lieutenant Commander Dutton. He displayed staunch determination, steadfastness and courage of the highest order.

Previously awarded the QGM for gallantry in 1975.

Obituary: BRIAN DUTTON

Lieutenant Commander Brian Dutton DSO QGM RN who has died recently (April 2018). Brian joined the Royal Navy as a boy seaman and at 16 was serving in HMS Belfast’s 'A' gun turret during the Korean War.  A member of the Physical Training Branch, he was wheelman on several occasions for the Chatham Field Gun Crew in the 1950s and rose to Petty Officer PT Instructor before being accepted as an Officer on the Special Duties List. After service in HM Ships Bulwark and Albion, the commando carriers, in 1969 he changed branches and became a Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving Officer. 

 In 1974, as the Officer-in-Charge of the Portsmouth and Medway Clearance Diving Team and working with Leading Seaman Barry Brett, he boarded the Suction Dredger ‘The Solent’ off Felixstowe on 3rd August to investigate and remove a German ground mine type GD which had become jammed in the vessel's drag head.  Severe damage to the fuse prevented identification and thus normal rendering safe procedures. With the dredger’s crew removed to safety he and Leading Seaman Brett eventually achieved the difficult task of wresting the mine from the vessel's drag head.  The mine was lowered to the seabed and detonated safely the following morning. Brian was subsequently gazetted for the Queens Gallantry Medal (QGM).

 In March 1982 Brian was coming to the end of his commissioned service in the Royal Navy. He was on his final leave and looking forward to tending his roses when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. With his leave cancelled and newly appointed as Officer in Charge of the hastily formed Fleet Clearance Diving Team 1, he was responsible for the disposal of bombs that had been dropped onto our ships without exploding. The worst case of several such operations was on HMS Argonaut where a single bomb took the best part of 6 days to remove.  On 8 October 1982, Brian was gazetted for the award of the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in recognition of his service during operations in the South Atlantic. 

 On return to the UK Brian was allowed to retire with the nation’s thanks. After leaving the RN, he became Mayor of the town of Petersfield and Chairman of the East Hampshire District Council while performing much charity work, including donating and fund raising for the Vernon Monument Project.

FCPO(D) Michael (Mick) FELLOWS BEM FCDT 1

DSC awarded in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.  

On 21st May 1982 FCPO(D) Fellows, Fleet Clearance Diving Team 1, was tasked to investigate an unexploded 1,000 Ib bomb on HMS ANTRIM. It proved impossible to determine whether the bomb was armed and the decision was taken to lift it from its position close to the Seaslug missile magazine to the Flight Deck where it could be lowered into the water.  This operation was hampered by further air attacks during which the team had to stay close to the bomb to prevent it from being jarred. Smoke from burning materials forced them to wear breathing apparatus and to carry out fire fighting tasks to keep heat away. However, after a difficult ten hour operation they succeeded in disposing of the bomb and damaged pyrotechnics from the magazine. This was the first unexploded bomb dealt with during the Falklands conflict and, despite the absence of precedent, FCPO(D) Fellows led his team with devotion to duty of the highest order and complete disregard for personal safety. The conspicuous bravery shown by the team was a major factor in safeguarding the ship and her crew.

Previously appointed BEM as CPO(D) Scotland & Northern Ireland Clearance Diving Team.

Subsequently appointed MBE in 1977 while on SofD's staff during rescue of passengers and recovery of bodies from capsized Herald of Free Enterprise car ferry at Zeebrugge.

Lieutenant Commander David Garwood Royal Navy

Mentioned in Dispatches in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

During the night of 10 June, HMS PICT (Lt Cdr David GARWOOD RN), (sister ship of the GAUL that had sunk in unknown circumstances while fishing) was tasked with HMS CORDELLA (Lt Cdr Martyn HOLLOWAY RN) in support to influence sweep Berkeley Sound.  Their objective was to clear an area for ships that would provide naval gunfire support for the final stages of the assault on Stanley. HMS PICT was the only ship available that had the special sweep system necessary.  Transferring all non-essential crew to HMS CORDELLA at sea at the entrance to Berkeley Sound, HMS PICT began sweeping but the risk increased markedly early in the operation when the influence sweep failed.  Clearly PICT was not built as a minesweeper and any breach in the hull would have resulted in the ship's rapid sinking.  Undeterred, knowing the importance of the mission, and in the knowledge that the Task Force Commander had accepted the risk of loss of a trawler, HMS PICT's Commanding Officer decided to turn his ship into a guinea pig.  HMS PICT was made as noisy as possible by running all machinery at various speeds and revving up the main engine while completing the required number of runs through the area. Fortunately no mines were found, HMS CORDELLA transferred the remaining crew back to HMS PICT.

The commanding officer displayed considerable courage and fortitude by his actions that night.  He readily accepted the task knowing the possible consequences.  With the knowledge that his ship was at extreme risk he realised that upon the success of his mission would depend the timely completion of military objectives ashore and the possible saving of a large number of own troops lives.  He should have withdrawn from the area when the sweep failed but elected instead to turn the ship into a ‘guinea pig’ in order to achieve the aim.  The high quality of leadership displayed, the sense of duty and professional attitude shown ensured the full support of the volunteer crew who remained onboard.’

CPO(D) Brian (Ben) GUNNELL FCDT

Mentioned in Dispatches in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

CPO(D) Leonard (Len) HEWETT FCDT

BEM awarded in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

LS(D) Philip KEARNS FCDT

Mentioned in Dispatches in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

A/PO(Sonar)(SM) Graham LIBBY HMS CONQUEROR

DSM awarded in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

Whilst on patrol north of the Falklands Islands on 25th May 1982 a floating wire aerial trapped round HMS CONQUEROR'S propeller causing cavitation and noise to the detriment of her operational effectiveness.

Acting Petty Officer (Sonar) (SM) Libby, a Ships Diver, volunteered to carry out a dive to free the obstruction. With the submarine surfaced he knew full well that if she were detected by Agentinian aircraft she would possibly have to dive without recovering him. He was also battered by heavy waves, threatening to part his lifeline and sweeping him away. Nonetheless he succeeded in clearing most of the obstruction, after twenty minutes in dark, freezing, and terrifying conditions, enabling HMS CONQUEROR to continue on her patrol unhindered.

Acting Petty Officer (Sonar) (SM) Libby demonstrated a degree of cold, calculated courage and willingness to risk his life for the benefit of his ship far beyond any call of duty.

Lt Cdr Iain MACKAY RN CWT

Mentioned in Dispatches in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

Sub Lt Peter MORGAN RN HMS ARGONAUT

DSC awarded in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

On 21st May 1982 Sub Lieutenant Morgan was Officer of the Watch in HMS ARGONAUT when the ship came under intense air attack. Bomb damage put both engines out of action and jammed the rudders when the ship was at full ahead speed, going straight towards and very close to the coastline. Sub Lieutenant Morgan almost certainly saved the ship from going aground by racing to the forecastle with two others to let go an anchor and stop her.

In his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of the Ships Diving Team he led his men on a two day operation to survey and make temporary repairs to bomb damage below the waterline. On two occasions he dived into the flooded forward magazine, in the knowledge that in addition to the hazards posed by twisted and jagged metal, there was an unexploded bomb in the compartment amongst damaged ordnance.

Throughout this dangerous and hectic period Sub Lieutenant Morgan displayed qualities of cool and quick thinking, as well as courage and stamina, in carrying out all his duties.

LS(D) Charles SMITHARD FCDT

Mentioned in Dispatches in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

LS(D) Anthony (Thommo) THOMPSON FCDT

Mentioned in Dispatches in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

CPO(D) Graham (Piggy) TROTTER FCDT 3

DSM awarded in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

On 28th May 1982, Chief Petty Officer (Diver) Trotter and Fleet Clearance Diving Team 3 were tasked to deal with an unexploded bomb on board RFA SIR LANCELOT. The bomb was awkwardly located in the film store amongst a great deal of debris which had to be cleared before removal operations could take place. The removal operation was further complicated by the need to cut away metal, the lack of strong points in the superstructure, lack of craneage and in the. final stage by fierce squalls which hindered sheer-leg manoeuvring. Notwithstanding these major problems, this difficult and complex operation was completed by 1000Z on 29th May when the bomb was lowered to the sea-bed.

The team displayed courage and determination of the highest order in overcoming all the difficulties to achieve the successful completion of this task and continuing operations despite a high level bombing raid. As the leader, Chief Petty Officer (Diver) Trotter provided the drive and resourcefulness which were essential factors required for this difficult and dangerous task.

AB(D) David WALTON FCDT

Mentioned in Dispatches in recognition of service during operations in the South Atlantic.

Read more about Mine Warfare, Diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal in the Falklands Conflict here.